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INTRODUCTION 
The Colorado River syst em is the major source of water for irrigated 
agriculture, industry, and direct consumption in western Colorado, Utah, 
western Arizona, southern Nevada, and southern California. 1 Although it 
drains a large geographical area, its flow is both quite small relative 
to the demand for it and highly variable. In the ,first quarter of this 
century competing claims for the Hater among those five states led to a bitter 
battle over both the distribution of water rights and the location and 
size of a possible storage a n d flood control dam and reservoir system. 
This battle culminated in a pproval in 1928 of the Boulder Canyon Project 
AcL and the Colorado Compact of 1922. At that time the building of Boulde r 
Dam and Lake Mead reservoir by the U.S. Bureau of Re clama tion were sanctioned 
and the river flow was divide d between the Upper Basin (Colorado, Utah, and 
extreme northern Arizona) and the Lowe r Basin (Nevada , California, and the 
rest of Arizona). The division was to be at Lee's Ferry, just north of the 
Grand Canyon. The agreement was that the Upper Basin would deliver 75 million 
acrefeet of water to the Lowe r Basin through Lee's Ferry every 10 year period. 
Later battles divided the Lm-1er Basin wa ter amon g the three states and among 
users within states. A U.S. treaty with Mexico forced both basins to a gree 
to deliver together 1.5 million acrefeet per year of low-saline-content Hater 
to Mexico. 
At the time the compact was drafted, the me~n annual floH of the rive r 
was thought to b e 15-16 million acref eet above Lee ' s Ferry and 1 million 
acrefee t below, so tha t e a ch basin was granted about h a l f on ave r age . Since 
. .. - -·· . 
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then the estimate has been lo\vered to about 13-14 million acrefeet total 
but the compact has not been revised to accord with this new estimate. 
At the same time, the demand for water from the Colorado system is 
growing significantly. Because Arizona has not been able to use its 
full allotment until now, California has expanded its consumption nearly 
1 million acrefeet per year beyond the 4.4 million acrefeet per year it 
is legally allowed. In the early 1980's, however, with the completion of 
, 
the Central Arizona Project to supply water to Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona 
can legally demand that California restrict its consumption to 4.4 million 
acrefeet per year if California's additional consumption competes with 
Arizona's right to receive deliveries of 2.8 million acrefeet per year. In 
addition, exploitation of oil shale deposits in the Upper Basin could in-
crease Upper Basin demand for water. 
While a water shortage will not develop immediately because Lake 
Mead in the Lower Basin and Lake Powell in the Upper Basin are both full, 
some further rationing scheme will have to be employed in the near future. 
This paper sets out a general model for the allocation of river water and 
discusses the inefficiencies in the current allocation system. Then, 
·recognizing the difficulties involved in making second-best policy prescrip-
tions, it suggests some ways that ineffi~iencies might be reduced without 
upsetting the delicate balance of property rights and income distributions 
associated with the use of that water. 
The paper is divided into three sections. First, an optimal pricing 
scheme for water is outlined and discussed. The second section identifies 
important ways in which current pricing schemes differ from the optimum. 
Finally, some policy changes are suggested. 
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AN OPTI~'\.L PRICING HODEL FOR WATER 
Colorado River water can be modelled as one of a general class of 
storable goods subject to uncertain supply. In a given year the supply 
of water is a random draw from a probability distribution which is 
determined not by man, but by the climate of the area. In order to use 
river water investments have ~o be made in pipes, pumping stations, and 
diversion canals. Storage of water requires investment in dams and reser-
voirs. Because of the time required to build these facilities, the decisions 
about delivery and storage capacity size have to be made before it is 
known how much water will be available. Because the sizes of these facilities 
cannot be changed easily once they are built and the amount of river flow 
will be different every year, the capacity sizes will generally not be the 
cost minimizing sizes after the river flow is known even if they are the 
expected cost minimizing sizes from an ex-ante point of view, Some years 
river flow will be so low that neither the storage nor the delivery 
capacity will be full and other years it '"ill be so high that some water 
will go to waste. 
The demand for water is also important in cetermining the optimal size 
storage and delivery capacity. If demand as well as supply is uncertain, 
the ex-ante choice of optimal storage and d e livery capacity is more 
complicated than if supply alone were uncertain. In a river system which 
dominat e s a region to the extent that the Colorado Rive r dominates the 
American southwest differences in river flow from year to year may result 
in diffeiences in relative prices and wages. Variations in r e lative prices 
and wages from year to year tYansla t e into variations in demand from year 
to year. 
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Once it is known hmv much water will be available and what the demand 
curve will be it has to be decided how much to consume this year und 
how much to store for future use. Since next year's flow and demand are 
also unknown, the storage decision is as complicated as the capacity size 
decision. If you store a lot and next year's flow is large, some water 
may go to waste, but if you don't store much and next year's flow is low 
you may wish you had consumed less and stored more. Ideally you would 
always have a full reservoir and full pipes with none going to waste. 
Since that situation will rarely be possible you have to choose between 
present consumption and storage for the future when future supply and 
demand are uncertain. 
Having allocated water between present and future consumption, 
other distributional questions still remain. How many variable inputs will 
be hired to deliver the water? How much water will go to production, such 
as growing food, and how much will go to direct consumption, such as for 
drinking and \·lashing? 
The appendix sets out a mathematical formulation of the choices 
described above. The results can be summarized briefly. Let us begin with 
an optimal price for water once it has been determined how much will be 
delivered this year and what the demand curve will be. As long as the 
supply to be delivered is less than delivery capacity, the optimal price i s 
at short run marginal delivery cost plus a competitive price for the 
right to deliver an acrefoot of water. If available supply exceeds 
delivery capacity the optimal price is at short run marginal delivery 
cost plus a competitive surcharge which brings demand and de livery capacity 
size to equilibrium. 
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Figure 1 illustrates how these pricing rules are determined. Let qc be 
the available delivery c a pacity, ~IDC be the marginal delivery cost and D be 
the known demand curve for water. If q > q the price of P and the sur-
e c 
charge will be Pc- ~IDC per acrefoot. At q 2 and q1 < qc' the prices will be 
P2 and P1 with P2 - ~C and Pi - ~C being the competitive prices for the 
right to deliver an acrefoot of water. This pricing rule should be applied 
both to water consumed directly and to water used to produce food or other 
products. As long as the marginal cost of delivering water to consumers is 
the same as the marginal cost of delivering water to firms, ' the price paid 
by each should be the same. The price of a good which uses water in its 
production process will then be higher by the marginal cost of whatever 
other inputs are required. 
It is more difficult to decide what is the correct price for water 
when delivery and storage capacity sizes and the amount of water to store 
have to be chosen also. Since these choices have to be made before it is 
known how much water will be available, they have to be made on the basis of 
how much water individual consumers and firms think will be available. If 
an omniscient planner were deciding how much delivery and storage capacity 
to build and how much water to store, he or she would face the following 
welfare problem. Make those choices in such a way that, at those capacity 
sizes and amount of stored Ha ter, it would not be possible, without knowing 
how much '"ater '"auld be available, to in(:rease the expected utility of any 
one consumer without lowering the expected utility of some other consume r. 
Given this definition, an ex-ante optimal size delivery or storage capacity 
or amount of storage is one which equates each consumer's discounted expecte d 
mar gina l rate of substitution bet~e en othe r goods and water with the ratio 
p 
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of discounted expected long run marginal costs, including the cos ts of 
building the delivery and storage capacity and storing the water. Also 
from an ex-ante point of view, an optimal set of anticipated prices for 
water and othe r goods associated with each possible amount of river flow 
equates discount e d, prob ability-weighted marginal rat e s of substitution 
across all consumers. 
If consumers have different beliefs about hm-1 much water will be 
available, gains from trade exist among consumers when decisions about 
both delivery and storage capacity size and storage of water are being 
made. Consider the follm-1ing simple example. Suppose Mr. A and Mr·. B 
jointly own a river on which they wish to build a dam, storage facility, 
and diversion works to deliver the water to their homes. Mr. A thinks it 
highly probable that river flow will be high in the next two periods, but 
Mr. B thinks it will probably be only moderate. Consequently, Mr. A 
considers a large storage facility unnecessary but he does want a relatively 
large diversion works. In constrast, Mr. B wants to build a relatively 
large storage fac i lity and a smaller diversion works. Assume that larger 
capacity costs more in both cases. Clearly, in the absence of transactions 
costs, Mr~ A would be willing to bribe Mr. B to build a larger diversion 
works and Mr. B \-7ould be willing to bribe Mr. A to build a larger storage 
facility and store more water. Thus, even though water itself is a private 
good,delivery and storage capacity and stored water look like public goods 
unless each person can bt:ild his own dam and store his mm water. 
Now consider two diffe r ent ways of finan~ing capa city expansion 
and organizing storage and water d e live rie s. In the first case, suppose 
firms producing both d e live ry and storag e capacity s e ll shares of those 
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capacities to consumers in a competitive market before starting to build. 
consumers who think there will be a great deal of water with high probabi-
lity will buy more delivery capacity shares than consumers who think 
capacity should be small. Firms will then build only as w.uch delivery 
capacity as they can sell in shares to consumers at competitive prices. 
similarly, consuwers will buy storage capacity shares on the basis of their 
beliefs about both the supply of and the demand for water in the future. 
Firms will also only build as much storage capacity as they can sell in 
shares to consumers. Consumers can then trade delivery and storage capa-
city units and water rights among themselves after both facilities have 
been built. In addition, consumers mvn water rights which they can either 
rent to firms or use to store water for the future in the storage facilities 
in which they own shares. In order to deliver a certain number of ac:refeet 
of water to their customers, firms would then have to rent an equal number 
of acrefeet of water rights and delivery capacity rights from consumers. 
In this market, the sale of shares becomes the mechanism for allmving 
the group represented by Mr. A to bribe that represented by Mr. B and visa 
versa. When water is to be delivered, delivery caoacity shares ·will rent for a 
ze~o price when the delivery capacity is not full and for a positive price 
when it is. Similarly, storage capacity shares will sell for a zero price 
when the reservoir is not full and a positive price ~vhen it is and rights 
to stored water will rent for a positive price <vhen this year's flow is 
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low and a zero price when it is high. The price per acrefoot of delivered 
water will then reflect all the scarcity and capacity charges \vhich are 
positive in that year. At a competitive equilibrium in the capacity 
rights market the expected rate of return will depend upon the distribution 
of risk preferences among consumers. 
In the second market, suppose each firm which delivers water builds 
or purchases its own capacity and stores its own water on the basis of the 
firm manager's beliefs about how much water will be available, discount 
rate on future profits, and attitude towards risk. Before observin~ how 
much water wil~ be available a competitive expected utility maximizing firm 
manager will build delivery and storage capacity and store water so that 
the discounted expected marginal utility of the price for delivered water 
equals the discounted expected mar~inal disutility of the cost. Since 
firms and not consumers have evaluated the capacity and storage choices, 
it is unlikely that this allocation mechanism will lead to an optimal 
choice. 
In fact, if firms own delivery and storage capacity and store water, 
finding an optimal price is very iimilar to designing an optimal tax. 
Before the available supply of \vater is knmvn, each consumer should pay 
a different lump sum tax for the use of delivery and storage capacity and 
stored water, which takes account of his individual utility function, 
beliefs, and discount rate for future consumption. 
As is well known, however, finding such a set of prices and then en-
forcing them in the face of arbitrage possibilities is close to impossible. 
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If the prices are not designed optimally, some consum~rs would still be 
willing to bribe the firm to build more delivery or storage capacity or 
store more water and others would wish the firm had built or stored less. 
If, however, all consumers and firms owning delivery and storage capacity 
and storing water have identical probability beliefs and discount rates 
over future consumption or profits and firms owning delivery and storage 
capacity maximize expected profits then these ?,ains from trade do not 
exist to begin with. In that case, a competitive market mechanism which 
has firms instead of consumers owning delivery and storage capacity and 
storing water would generate an optimal price for water, optjmal sized 
delivery and storage facilities and optimal quantities of stored water. 
The above discussion of optimality conditions under the two market 
structures assumed that incomes and relative prices were the same rega rd-
less of how much water was available in a particular y e ar. If \ve relax 
that assumption, each consumer's de mand for Wdter will also be uncertain. 
These income effects distort consumers' ex-ante evaluations of the anti-
cipated price ratios acorss different river flows and make it difficult 
for a competitive mechanism to achieve an allocation of water and other 
goods that equates the discounted probability-weighted marginal rates of 
substitution across consumers. If the anticipated allocation is not op-
timal, then the signals consumers or firms receive when they are decidin g 
how many delivery or storage capacity units to buy or the amount of water 
to store will not be correct and those decisions will not be made optimally. 
There are two ways to avoid the problems creat e d by these income effects 
when the y are sign ificant. One is to make all production and cons umption 
decisions before it is kno"rn how much wa ter will b e available. In t\vo 
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seminal works on the competitive market under uncertainty Arrow (1964) and 
Debreu (1959) suggested a market in contingent commodity claims as a 
way of circumventing the welfare problems created by uncertainty. In their 
market consumers would purchase a portfolio of consumption plans, one for 
each possible amount of river flow, for example. Similarly, firms would 
contract for a set of inputs to be used in conjunction with each possible 
river flow. All these transactions would be carried out before any pro-
duction or consumption was allowed. After the river flow was known firms 
would simply produce the appropriate amount of goods and distribute the 
output on the _basis of the distribution of contingent commodity claims. No 
further trading would be allowed. Since all transactions would take place 
before the river flow was known, there would be no uncertainty about income, 
relative prices, or firm profits. Thus, there would be no uncertainty about 
demand and firms would assume no risks. This implies that regardless of 
which group owned delivery and storage capacity and stored water, these 
ex-ante choices would be made optimally. 
If all the futures markets envisioned b y Arrow and Debreu did not exist, 
then some choices would be made in spot markets after it '"as known hoH much 
water would be available. In that case, the following restrictions on 
differentiable expected utility functions would be necessary to achieve 
the condition that ex-ante discounted probability-weighted marginal rates 
of substitution would be equal across consumers. Ex-ante ratios of marginal 
utilities of income across all pairs of possible river flows in all time 
periods would have to be equal across consumers. In other words, if two 
possible river flows were 2 and 4 and my ex-ante marginal utilities of in-
come were 5 and 8, respectively, then your ratio of ex-ante marginal utilities 
across those two possible river ~lows would have to be 5/8. If this condition 
PRICING OF WATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
The actual pricing of Hater in the Colorado River distribution system of 
Southern California differs from the optimal pricing structure discussed in 
a variety of ways. To begin with, the market for delivered water is not 
competitive. Instead, water is treated as a public utility and each consumer 
is served by only one water company. Each water compar,y, whether municipal 
or private, has the exclusive right ·to serve a particular area. Prices are 
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is fulfilled, it implies that ex-ante, the marginal rates of substitution for 
income and therefore total consumption in different states of the world and 
different time periods are equal across consumers. 
If consumers own delivery and storage capacity and stored water, then 
this condition on consumer utility functions is sufficient to ensure an 
ex-ante optimal choice of delivery or storage capacity or stored water.If 
firms otvn these risky assets, then a stronger sufficient condition is needed, 
although the condition discussed above is still necessary. This stronger con-
dition is that consumers' ex-ante ~rginal utilities of income are discounted 
constant functions of their subjective probability beliefs. This assumption 
implies that after it is knotvn how much water is available, each consumer's 
marginal utility of income will be the same for every amount of water available. 
PRICING OF WATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
The actual pricing of water in the Colorado River distribution system of 
Southern California differs from the optimal pricing structure discussed in 
a variety of ways. To begin with, the ma rket for delivered water is not 
competitive. Instead, water is treated as a public utility and each consumer 
is served by only one water company. Each water company, whether municipal 
or private, has the exclusive right to serve a particular area. Prices are 
set either by municipal gove rnments or by water district governments or, in 
the case of private water c ompanies, by the California Public Utilities Com-
mission. Although pricing rule s differ, a majority of water companies use a 
two part or eyen a three part tariff. Generally property taxes levied on 
custome rs of a water district cover some or all of the. price for delivere d 
water. In addition, there is often a fixed monthly charge, at leas t for 
residential and comme rcial customers, which varies ~·lith the size of the es-
tablishment. This fixed cha r ge may or may not cover some minimum nu!llb e r of 
-12-
acrefeet consumed each month. Agricultural users may not ahvays pay a 
fixed charge in addition to their acreage assessments even when residential 
users in the same area do pay one. Finally, with some exceptions, users 
pay a price per acrefoot for the \vater they actually use in addition to 
whatever minimum they might be allmved with their fixed monthly payments. 
On the face of it this pricing structure appears as though it might 
be an attempt to legislate a pricing structure \vhich resembles an optimal 
· structure. Customers pay lump sum taxes and charges as entrance and 
maintenance fees and then pay marginal charges for the water they actually 
use. These charges may not be optimal in the sense that 1) they probably 
do not equate discounted expected margina:J_ rates of substitution and dis-
counted expected marginal costs and 2) they are not based on consumer pro-
bability beliefs and discoun t rates. However, the structure itself might 
be second-best. 
This surface similarity with an optimal pricing and taxing structure 
hides some important inefficiencies. Three in particular merit co~~ent. 
First, the marginal charge paid by customers is generally too low from a 
welfare point of view. This statement can be made because there is no 
market for rights simply to divert the water. The marginal charges only 
cover pumping, treatment, transport, and delivery costs . Rights to divert 
the water in the first place are allocated according to what is cal~ed the 
appropriative water rights system. Briefly, the system works as follows. 
Water districts gain the right to deliver to customers a certain n~mber of 
acrefeet of water per year by dive rting it and putting it to "b eneficial 
consumptive u se .'' In a given year, the available river flow is allocated 
by allowing the water district which diverted \•la t er first, historically, to 
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take all its allotment before the next more recent water district takes it 
and so on. In other words~ "first in time means first in right." Once the 
water has been divided in this manner, a secondary market in which more 
junior water districts would pay more senior water districts for the 
right to divert more water in a given year is generally ruled out because 
tbc Bureau of Recalmation does allow sales or rental of water among users 
whose diversion works it helped finance. All the major water districts 
such as the Imperial Valley Irrigation District and the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California are subject to this exclusion. 
This allocation mechanism is economically inefficient for two 
reasons. First, there is no mechanism for allocating water to its most 
productive uses. Each senior water district is encouraged to use water 
until its marginal productivity or utility is zero even though higher 
profits or utility could be achieved if senior water districts could rent 
or sell rights to junior water districts. Second, as Burness and Quirk 
(1978) have shown, the priority system forces junior water districts to 
bear all the risks. If each water district were a farm, an optimal 
allocation of risk bearing would have agricultural firms of equal size 
bearing equal risks. 
The second type of inefficiency in the price and tax structure 
is that agriculture is subsidized at the expense of residential and 
commercial use. Agricultural users pay about half to two thirds the 
marginal charges that other users pay for the same water .. From the stand-
point of economic efficiency a better way to provide relief to both farmers 
and consumers would be to give lump sum grants and make water and food 
prices equal to their long run marginal costs. 
-14-
TI1e third type of inefficiency is in the way that large scale delivery 
and storage capacity projects are financed. Most of them have been built 
with federal grants or low interest loans from the general tax revenues of 
the U.S. and state governments. That means of financing would no~ ~eces-
sarily be inefficient if water districts paid the true marginal cost for 
the use of those capacities and the price paid by customers reflected those 
rental payments. Instead, however, general tax payers pay for storage and 
delivery capacity and the prices of water and food are lower than the prices 
which cover long run marginal costs. 
SUGGESTED POLICY ALTERNATIVES. 
I would like to propose three possible changes in public policy. Each 
is directed at attempting to correct one of the specific inefficiencies 
I 
outlined above. First, suppose water districts could buy and sell percentage 
shares of their own and other water districts' priority rights. Suppose 
further that water districts could purchase a portfolio of shares from each 
other water district, one set of shares for each possible flow of the 
river. After the flow were kno•vn they could even trade agai~ among themselves 
if they did not like the portfolio they had bought before. Such a market 
would be like the Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity claims market discussed 
above, but flexibility would be allowed if gains from trade still existed after 
the river flow were known. 
The model outlined in the appendix shows that such a market would 
achieve an efficient allocation of water rights and an optimal scarcity 
charge for \vater if it were competitive. To evaluate the usP.fulness of that 
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result, we need to know 1) whether such a semi-contingent claims market 
might develop if the ban on sales of rights were lifted and 2) if so, whether 
it would be competitive? The first question is somewhat easier to speculate 
about than the second. Currently there is little incentive for the develop-
ment of such a system b0cause all water districts have been able to get more 
than their full allotments every year and acreage limitations imposed by the 
Bureau of Recalmation preclude expansion of water use in most water districts. 
The expectation is the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California which 
could probably sell more water than it currently does if it built a larger de-
livery system. 
Such a market might easily become more attractive after the Central 
Arizona Project is completed, hm·1ever. The Metropolitan Water District is a 
relatively junior appropriato:rr in California and will therefore be one of 
the first to have to reduce its diversions when California must · reduce diver-
sions to 4. 4 million acrefeet annually. Further, even \•Then California 
restricts itself to 4.4 million acrefeet annually, the Central Artzon9 Proiect, the 
most junior appropriator, may face random shortages if the Upper Basin states 
go several years without delivering their full co~itment through Lee's Ferry. 
2 
This can be anticipated because power demands on Hoover Dam require that the 
Lake Mead reservoir mever be drained do\vn very far. If Tucson and Phoenix 
were in danger of losing their supplemental water suoply, the Central Arizona 
Project also might wish to purchase or rent rights from other water districts. 
Ai least twowater districts can be expected to want to sell or rent 
rights to other water districts. The Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley 
irrigation districts have the right to about 3.5 ~illion acrefeet of water per 
year. They are second in seniority in California behind the Palo Verde Irriga-
tion District which only has rights to about 350,000 acrefeet. The cana l 
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which brings water from the Colorado to the Salton Sea area is unline d and 
traverses one of the hottest deserts in the world. ~e dis tricts' allotment 
of water is so large relative to the demand for water in the districts that 
water is practically free and there is therefore no incentive to invest 
resources to conserve water by lining and covering the canal. They must con-
tinue to divert that much water every year in order to maintain their appropri-
ative right, howeve r. If they do not continue to make "beneficial consumptive 
use" of all the water in their right, they could lose sam~ without compensation. 
~e availability of such a market would provide the Imperial and Coachella 
Valley Irrigation Districts with a more productive use for their water which 
ic currently allowed to go to waste. 
While the demand for some kind of market in water rights may exist, 
water districts may find a contingent claims market too difficult to administer 
and enforce. It is more likel~ that more senior firms will simply rent per-
centages of their rights to more jun.ior firms in spot trans actions during 
shortages. Such an unpredictable market would not help firms make better ex-ante 
capacity and storage choices because it would be difficult to anticipate quanti-
ties available and prices, but it would improve the spot allocation and pricing 
of water, ex-post. 
The question of whether the market might be competitive is more 
difficult to answer. The above discus s ion sugges ts that there are at least 
two buyers and two sellers of rights which can be easily identified. Such a 
distribution of economic agents could hardly be seen as competitive. More 
potential buyers and sellers might be found among rights holders in the Upper 
Basin, but transfers of wa~er between basins would require a renegotiation of 
the Colorado Compac t. That drastic a change in the distribution of the water 
is unlikely in the near future because of long-standing animosity between 
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the basins. Even transactions between rights holders in California and 
Arizona may be hampered by the legacy of feuding over water allocations 
between those two states. In the near future, therefore, it appears that 
such a market in rights would be subject to some monopoly power on both the 
supply side and the demand side . Even though this market would probably not 
be competitive, however, it could be argued that it would be better to let 
some market attach a scarcity value to water than to continue to have two 
water districts waste water that other districts and their customers might be 
willing to pay for. 
The second policy suggestion is that agricultural and residential 
charges for water of equal quality be equalized gradually. A sudden equaliza-
tion might correct inefficiencies, but it would not be a Pareto superior policy. 
Farmers and purchasers of farm products would suffer and direct consumers of 
r 
water would benefit. A policy of gradually equalizing water rates would 
allow farmers to make necessary long run adjustments and, therefore, reduce 
the hardship to farmers and consumers of food. 
The third suggestion is that there be a fundamental change in the 
way large scale water storage and delivery systems are financed in the 
future. An immediate reduction in the state and federal subsidy for these 
projects is probably neither possible nor desirable. Large sums of money 
have already been sunk into dams, reservoirs and diversion canals, all of 
which are relatively long-lived. Given that these capacity units exist and 
are seldom used to capacity an optimal pricing rule is to price at the ex-
pected value of short run delivery and storage costs including a scarcity for 
the virgir. flow. Decisions on future delivery and storage capacity expansion 
projects might be made by selling capacity unit s to individuals served by the 
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water projects. These would then be rented back to firms delivering vater. 
While this is a radical departure from the current policy of government 
support, such a market might develop like a commodities market. The benefits 
would be that only as much capacity would be build as individuals would be 
willing to pay for and that prices paid for delivered water would reflect 
the costs of providing additional delivery and storage capacity. 
Conclusion 
The above theoretical and institutional remarks indicate that 
consumers of water districts which have senior rights to Colorado River water 
benefit substantially from federal policy regarding the pricing and allocation 
of that water. They pay no scarcity charge, they do not finance their O\~ 
delivery or storage facilities, and, if they are farmers, they pay less than 
whatever marginal delivery costs their water districts might incur. ~fuile 
this observation is not new, there has not been a comprehensive statement of 
what an optimal pricing rule and market allocation mechanism might be. ~1ile 
more research is needed on such details as the potential for a market in 
shares of appropriative rights and the economic effects of changing to private 
share financing of capital projects, this paper provides an attempt at a com-
prehensive theoretical framework for organizing a review of federal water 
allocation policy. 
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Appendix 
This appendix sets out the model used to develop the propositions 
set fon1ard in the text. Proofs of the propositions follow by solving 
the constrained maximiz a tion problems. 
I. Ex-ante Optimality Conditions 
Assume that there are n consumers, each denote d i, three goods 
produced and traded, S random states of the world each denoted s, and 2 
time periods. Good x is water directly consumed, v is food, which uses 
water in its production process, and y is a composite good. 
In this model, there are 2 consumption periods and delivery and storage 
capacity are built before any consumption takes place. In that pre-COLiSUPtption 
period, consumption plans are made contingent on the obs~rvation of the random 
variable in period 1, subject to the constraint that no more water can be 
consumed than is available. Then, for every observation of the random variable 
'-- . 
iri period 1, there is an ex-ante optimal storage, an optimal change in delivery 
capacity, and on optimal port f olio of consumption plans contingent on the 
observation of the random variable in period 2. All capacity units are 
dismantled at the end of period 2. 
The technique applied to analyze this problem will be to maximize 
a welfare function subject to random constraints. The results are 
mathematically equivalent to those obtained from a dynamic programming 
analysis. This technique was employed in preference to dynamic program-
ming, however, because the results close ly rese mble the r e sults 
obtained from other analyses of welfare conditions under uncertainty. 
1 Now, to introduce the mod e l, let x. be i's consumption of water 
1S 
in period l,state s and x~ be i's consumption of water in period 2, 
1rs 
.,.-Lu-
state r, given s i n ~e riod l. v 1 is food consume d by i in period 1, state s is 
2 
and virs is food c c :. 1ume d by i in period 2, stater, givens. Food is 
produced according : ~ produc tion functions v(x1 ,L1 ) 
VS VS 
2 2 
and v(x , L ) 
vrs vrs 
in periods 1 and 2, s tates s and r, given s, where xl 
VS 
2 
and x are water 
vrs 
. 1 
devoted to food producti on a nd L 
vs 
2 
and L 
vrs 
are labor d evoted to food 
production. ¥. v 1 ~ v(xl • L1 ) Vs and ¥ v~ ~ 
i=l iS vs vs i=l 1rs 
2 z 
v(x L ) Vr,s. 
vrs' vrs 
Water is delivered according to delivery functions x(L1 )and x(L2 ) 
xs xrs 
in periods 1, state sand 2, state r, givens, where L1 
xs 
2 
and L 
xrs 
are 
n 1 l 1 n 2 
labor devoted to water delivery. L x. + x < x(L ) Vs and L x. + 
i=l 1s vs xs i=l 1rs 
2 < 2 ) 1 2 1 b] x x(L Vr,s. zs and zr are the random supplies of water avai. .a .e 
vrs- xrs 
in periods 1, state s and 2, state 1 2 r, where z and z 'are independently 
s r 
and identically distributed according to i's discrete subjective pro-
babilities a. and a .. 1s 1.r 
1 1 
z can either be consumed as x(L ) or stored as 
S XS 
1 . 1 ~ 1n t1e storage 
s 
facility, subject to storage losses of es(O,l) per 
tr.r:it of storage. Delivery of water is through capacity produced according 
A 0 A 1 
to functions x(LA ) in period 0 and x(LA ) in period 1, state s, whe~e 
X XS 
0 . 1 
Lx is labor devoted to delivery capacity in period 0 and Lis is labor devoted 
1 A 0 2 
to delivery capacity in period 1, state s. x(L ) < x(L~) Vs and x(L ) < 
xs x xrs -
x(L~ ) Vr,s. Storage capacity is produced in period 0 according to production 
XS 
function F(Lf), where Lf is labor devoted to the production of storage capacity. 
x! ~ F(Lf) Vs and Lf + L~ n 0 v1here Lo is labor supplied by i in < L L . , X i=l 1 1 
period 0. 
Now, let y~8 and y~rs be i's consumption of a compos itE: good in 
periods 1, state s and 2, state r, give n s. y is produced according to 
d t . funct-..._"ons l'Ll ) d ( r 2 ) h Ll . L2 1 b pro uc 1on y an y u , w ere ys ana yrs are a or ys yrs 
devoted to the production of y in p e riods 1, state s and 2, state r, 
given s. Ll + Ll 
xs vs 
< ¥ L1 Vs and L2 + L2 + ~i=l is xrs vrs 
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n L~rs ~i:l L~rs Vr,s, where L~s and L~rs are labor supplied by i in periods 
1, state s and 2, state r, given s. 
Assume that no consumption takes place in period 0. Consumer i 
supplies labor to the production of storage and delivery capacity 
according to differentiable utility function u.(L?). In periods 1, state 
1 1 
s and 2, state r, given s, consumer i has strictly quasi-concave differen-
These utility functions are assumed to have the following regularity properties: 
Lim au. au·. aul aul LiJTJ 1 Lim 1 Lim Lim 2 
1 1 1 1 1 2 -2 v. -+ 0 
-+ 0 ax. 1 1rs X. v. -+ 0 av. Y. -+ 0 ay. X. -+ 0 ax. 1S 1S 1S 1S 1"8 1S 1rs 1rs 
au .. au. Bu. Lim i Lim au1 Lim 1 1 +ro 1 
2 2 
-+ 0 a 2 
v,r,sr~ aL~ r 1 -, 1 av. Yirs 
h:s/daJ 
L -+ 1rs yirs 1 is .aL. 
24 L24 hrs/day_j 18 
'-.. 
Lim 
~L~ -+ 1rs 4 hrs/day 
- a~. 1 Vi,r,s; -
"" 
aL2 1rs 
Lim au. Lim 1 0 Vi,s; > 1 1 2 y > 
"" 
ay. X. -+ "" 
is 1S 1rs 
· au. Lim 
2 
yirs-+ 
1 
-- > 
a- 2 
Lim 0 Vi, r, s; 0 L.-+ 0 
1 "" yirs 
Clu 
and Lim i 
L2 -+ 0 aL2 
. irs irs 
< 0 Vi,r,s. 
Lim 
1 
X. 1S 
au1 
-- > 2 
ax. 1rs 
au. 1 0 > 1 
-+ co ax. 1S 
0 Vi,r,s; 
Vi, 
Lim 
2 
s; 
Lim 
1 -+ 
"" v. 1S 
au. 
1 
v -+ co 
irs 2 
av. 1rs 
au. 
1. 
-- > 0 Vi, 1 
av. 1S 
> 0 Vi,r,s; 
au. 
1 Lim 
< 0 Vi; 
L1 -+ 0 aL~ < 0 Vi,s; is 1s 
s; 
These assumptions ensure that water, food, and the composite 
good will always be consumed in positive quantities by all consumers 
and that all consumers will always supply positive amounts of labor. 
This allows an ex-ante Pareto Optimal allocation of water, food, and 
the composite good to be described by maximizing a weighted sum of 
individual utility functions. 
n s 
Let w =iglei {u. (LQ) +sgl a ~ 1 is 
1 1 1 ' 1 R [u.Cx:. ,v. •Yi L. ) + oirgla;ru; l. ~S l.S S l.S ... _.. 
2 2 2 2 . 
(xirs' virs' Yirs' L. ))}, ~rs 
where: s. welfare weight assigned to i• l. ,
oi i's individual discount rate. 
The welfare problem is . to maximize W subject 
n 1 1 
E < (L ) i=l yis y ys 
n 
E 2 < (L2 ) 
. yirs- y yrs · 
l.=l 
n 1 E v 
i=l is 
< v(x1 , L1 ) 
- VS VS 
n 2 < v(x2 L2 ) 
E v · - vrs' vrs i=ll.rs 
n 1 
E x. l.S 
i=l 
+ x 1 < x(L1 ) VS- XS 
n 2 2 2 E x. + x < x(L ) 
i=l l.rs vrs- xrs 
x(L1 ) XS < 
2 
x(L ) < 
xrs 
x(L1 
A 
(L2 ) < X 
xs X 
) 
x(L2 · ) 
A 
(L! ) < . X 
xrs xs 
xl < F(Lf) s 
, 
Vs 
Vr,s 
Vs 
Vr,s 
Vs 
Vr,s 
Vs 
Vr,s 
.Vs 
Vr,s 
Vs 
and 
to the following constraints. 
t X Fl ~i 
11 11 11 1~ n L~ + + + < Vs vs xs ys xs -. L:l 1S 1= 
12 L2 12 n L2. + + < 
.1:1 Vr,s vrs xrs yrs - 1= 1rs 
Solving the welfare problem outlined above allows the following 
propositions to be stated: 
Proposition 1. An optimal allocation of water equates the expected marginal 
social value of water used for food production to the expected marginal 
social value of water used for direct consumption. 
Proposition 2. For every combination of future states and future periods, the 
discounted probability-\Jeighted marginal rate of substitution between water 
and other goods is equal across consumers. 
Proposition 3. For states of the \vorld such that capacity or available inventory 
is a binding constraint on water deliveries, an ex-ante optimal choice of delivery 
or storage capacity or an ex-ante inventory policy equates the discounted expec-
'-ted marginal rate of substitution between water and other goods for each consumer 
and the discounted expected ratio of marginal resource values. 
II. Competitive Market Allocations 
Turning now to market allocations, a set of competitive markets in \..rater, 
food, and y might be organized in one of two different ways; either consumers 
own delivery and storage capacity and store water or firms do. Let us assume 
for simplicity that there is only one firm producing each good and that each 
firm behaves as if there is a competitive market (i.e. takes prices as given). 
The firm delivering water builds both delivery and storage capacity, but •..rhen 
consumers own rights the firm sells all its capacity back to consumers as soon 
as it is built. When consumers o~~ rights, consumer i can store water equal to 
his storage capacity shares. 
Consumers get all the profits of the firms on a profit sharing basis. 
When firms own rights, consumers still get all the profits, but capacity 
and inventory decisions are made by firm managers who may have different 
subjective probability distributions, discount rates, and attitudes 
towards risk than consumers have. We can now describe the competitive 
market by the follmving set of maximization problems. 
If consumers mvn capacity and inventory, consumer i' s decision 
problem is: 
Subject to: 
h 0 h 1 
X. ,x. 1 . 1S 
X~ 1S 
0 ~a ph X X 
1 1 
Pxsxis 
0 Fo s 0 0 ;:: . J 0 0 ITO + pf + E qs[ris - <.w L + e. 1 s=l 1S i 1X X 
+ 
1 1 
+ 
" 1 v~ 1 h1 ~a 1 [F1 pysyis P~s + P:Xs[xis- X.) + pfs is 1S 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w L. + c~ ' x. + c [r. - X. ) +e. II + S 1S XS 1S qs 1SS 1S 1X XS 
+e. rr 1 1V VS Vs 
- ... - · .. ·-·-· · - ... --
F?J + 1 
w2 L~ + px?rs ~~s + q2 {X~ [1-e) + r~ } + 
rs 1rs ~ rs 1s 1rs . 
e. 
2 
+ e. II2 + e. rr2 Vr, II s 1x xrs 1y yrs 1V vrs 
X~ < F~ Vs, where 1S 1S 
selling price for a unit of delivery capacity in period 0, 
period 1, state s, and period 2, state r, given s in period 1; 
delivery capacity units purchased by i in period 0 and in 
period 1, state s; 
water stored by i in period 1, state s; 
pO 1 
f' pfs price of a unit of storage capacity in period 0 and period 1, 
state s; 
storage capacity units purchas ed by i in period 0 and period 1, 
state s; 
0 1 2 11. . f d 1. . h . . d 0 q ,q ,q = se 1ng pr1ce or a state r e 1very r1g t 1n per1o , 
r rs rs 
period 1, state s and period 2, given s in p e riod 1; 
0 1 
·rir' rir' rirs i's initial endowment of state r delivery rights and 
purchases of state r delivery rights in period 0 and period 1, 
state s; 
0 1 2 
w ,ws,w rs = wage rate in period 0, period 1, state s, and period 2, 
state r, given s; 
e. ,e. ,e. = i's share of x,y, and v firm profits; 
J..X 1y 1V 
ITO ITl IT 2 = firm X profits; 
x' xs' xrs 
ITO ITl IT2 
= firm y profits; y' ys' yrs 
ITO 
v' 
ITl IT2 
vs' vrs 
firm v profits; and 
1 
c = rental rates for delivery capacity and sta te s delivery rights qs 
in period 1, state s. 
Firm x's decision problem is: 
k_-
+ L~s] - c~sr!- ctsx!] + 0i r!l axr ~x [p;rsx(L~rs) - w;s1~rs- q;s r;s- P~rs~;s) } 
s.t. 1 x(L ) < 
xs 
1 
r 
s 
2 
x(L2 ) 
. xrs 
< r 
rs 
1 
·x(L ) < 
XS 
x(L2 ) 
xrs 
Vs 
Vr, s 
Vr,s. 
Firm y's decision problem is: 
max 
S R 2 
E a {~ (p1 y(L1 ) - w1L1 ) + 6 E a ~ (p v(L2 ) - w2 L2 )}. 
s=l ys y ys· ys s ys y r=l yr y yrs· yrs rs yrs 
Firm v's decision problem is: 
¥ a {"' (pl 
max s=l vs ~v vs (Ll v vs' 
X2 ) 2 2 - w L 
vrs rs vrs 
- 2 x2 ) } h pxrs vrs ' w ere 
a a a 
xs' ys' vs firm x, y t and v' s subjective p:.-obability of beiTig 
in s; 
~x'~y' ~v = firm x, y, and v's differentiable utility function over profits; 
o ~o ,5 = firm x, y, and v's discount rate; 
X y V 
r
1 
= water delivery rights rented by firm x in period 1 
rs 
state S and purchased by firm X in period 2, 
state r, given s; and 
delivery capacity rights · rented by firm x in period 1, 
" 
state s and purchased by firm ·x in period 2, state r, given s. 
If, on the other hand, firm x . o\vns capacity and storage rights, 
consumer and firm x maximization problems will be different. In this 
case, consumer i's problem becomes: 
max E U. as above 
]. 
2 2 2 2 + 2 2 2 L2 
P X + p y p V < W . xrs irs yrs irs vrs ·irs rs 1rs 
e. n2 
J.V vrs 
+e. n2 
J.X xrs 
+ e. n
2 
+ 
J.Y yrs 
Firm x's problem becomes: 
max -
0 s 1 1 11 1 wo<r~ + Lf) + L ~~s {¢ (p x(L ) - w [L + LA ') + X s=l -x X XS XS S XS XSJ 
s. t. 1 1 1 x(L ) < z 
..... xs Vs xs - s 
x(L2 ) < r(l-e) · + 2 Vr,s z 
xrs s r 
x(L1 ) A 0 < X(LA) Vs 
xs X 
x(L2 ) A 1" < X(LA ) Vr,s 
xrs XS 
; < F(L~) Vs s 
An analysis of the first order conditions derived from the competitive 
problems outlined above allows the following additional propositions 
to be stated. 
Proposition 4: \~en consumers hold title to delivery and storage_capacity 
and stored water, a necessary and sufficient condition for an ex-ante optimal 
choice of delivery and storage capacity and stored water and ex-ante optimal 
anticipated allocation of water and other goods is for the ratios of ex-ante 
marginal utilities of income across all states of the world and all time 
periods to be equal across consumers. 
Proposition 5: The following conditions are sufficient to ensure an ex-ante 
optimal allocation of wate r, delivery and storage capacity and stored water 
when firms hold title to de livery and storage capacity and stored water 
and sell output in an ex-post competitive spot market: 
1. necessary condition in Proposition 4; 
2. consumer ex-ante marginal utilities of income 
are discounted constant functions of their s ubj ec tive probability 
distributions ; 
have identical discount rates _and subjective probability 
distributions; and 
4. firms owning capacity and inventories maximize expected profits. 
III. Competitive Harket s with Appropriative \-later Rights 
For this model assume that all the sufficient conditions for pro-
position 5 hold and that the re are m firms delivering water. To 
describe a market in appropriative water rights with saleable percentage 
shares of rights which are contingent on an observation 
saleable percentage shares of rights which are contingent on an observation 
of the random river "flow, we number states of the world in order of increasing 
river flows and segment the probability distribution into m + 1 blocks, each 
of the first m corresponding to a firm's original appropriative right and 
st the m + 1 -- describing the unappropriated portion of the probability 
distribution. Assuming expected profit maximization and a kno•vn discount 
rate and prob~bility distribution, firm x 's problem becomes : j 
lik.. :rk 0 
+ LJ.f] - I: E [S.k-
k=l r=r J r 
k-1 
m 
E 
k=l 
rk 
E [S: 
r=r Jkrs 
k-1 
m+l +q 
R. 1 +o2: 2: 
_kq rs a r 
r=r 
[ 2 x(L: ) pxrs JXrs 
2 
-w 
rs 
L
2 q#m+l 
- 2: jxrs k=l 1<. q=l 
q-1 
2 . 
[Sjkrs 
s.t. 
1 
s.k J ~ J rs 
1 . 
x(L. 
JXSR, 
) 
2 
x(L. ) JXr s q 
1 
x(L. ) 
JXS 
2 
x(L. ) JXrs 
xl js < 
2 -
qkrs]J 
i rk 
t31 X~ < 2: E ~- lJs k=l 
r=rk-1 
jkrs JS 
X~ (1-8) q s2 < + 2: ~ lJr,s 
JS k=l jkrs 
~ 
(L ?~ ) < X lJs ]X 
A 
(L ~ ~ ) < X lJr,s JXS 
lJs 
The consumer, y firm, and v firm problems are unchanged. 
At"l. analysis of the first order conditions from these problems 
allows the following proposition to be stated: 
Proposition 6_: If all the sufficient conditions outlined in proposition S 
are satisfied, then a competitive market operating under the legal 
system of appropriative wa.ter rights is ex-ante Pareto optimal, given the 
existence of a competitive market in percentage shares of appropriative 
water rights which are purchased contingent on the observation of the river 
flow. 
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Footnotes 
1 Th . f . h c 1 d c d h . fl . f e 1n ormat1on on t e o ora o ompact an t e r1ver ow 1s rom 
Hundley (1975). 
2 Boulder Dam became Hoover Dam by an act of Congress in 1947. 
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